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Using an international database featuring 1,624 mutual funds over 15 years, this paper analyses 
the joint abilities of performance measures to predict subsequent fund failure. We examine the 
probability of disappearance over a time window, and expected fund survival time, and study the 
circumstances of a fund’s disappearance, its currency and domicile. By combining relevant 
measures, fund failure appears to a significant extent predictable, more than with single classical 
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measures. Survivorship predictability has significant economic value. Such evidence suggests 
that past performance does not only influence investors’ perception of fund quality, but also 
reflects managers’ ability to sustain performance. 
Keywords: Fund survival, performance measurement, persistence analysis, mutual funds 




For different reasons, mutual fund survivorship has been an ongoing concern since the early 
1990s. Many researchers have studied this phenomenon because of the so-called “survivorship 
bias”. Ignoring funds that disappear while analyzing their performance generates an important 
bias: since the funds that failed during the period are omitted, only the funds that stayed alive 
during the whole period are selected. Another collection of papers has focused on the assessment 
of the percentage of “graveyard” funds, i.e. those that disappear within a certain period. But only 
few studies have aimed to examine the determinants of fund terminations. Even though the field 
of performance measurement has considerably expanded since the turn of the century, no recent 
paper has related funds disappearance to an extensive review of their past risk-adjusted 
performance beyond the classical measures developed in the sixties and seventies. 
A first stream of papers relates a fund’s fate to its past returns. Through their analysis of the 
determinants of mutual funds survivorship, Brown and Goetzmann (1995) uncover the link 
between the likelihood of fund disappearance with its past returns, going back three years. 
Carhart (1997) even finds that dead funds underperform until five years before their 
disappearance. Brown et al. (1997), Malkiel (1995) and Elton et al. (1996) show that only the 
best performers survive for a long period of time, while weaker ones are likely to be closed. 
Cameron and Hall (2003) discover that excess returns relative to a market index are much better 
predictors of fund failure than gross returns. They obtain an asymmetric link between shocks and 
disappearance: positive shocks have a larger impact than negative shocks. 
In parallel, some researchers have focused on the reasons underlying fund terminations. 
Sawicki (2001) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) point out that investors base their fund purchase 
decisions on prior performance. However, in most studies following this approach, the authors 
solely focus on classical performance measures: gross return, return on excess of a market index, 
4 
Jensen alpha (Jensen, 1968), Fama and French 3-factors alpha (Fama and French, 1993), Carhart 
4-factors alpha (Carhart, 1997). Rohleder et al. (2011) compare the results given by the last four 
different measures to estimate the size of the survivorship bias obtained with different methods 
with US mutual fund data. 
Recent research on mutual fund survival has largely diverged from the examination of past 
performance as a predictor of failure. Many other determinants of fund death have been 
investigated: size (Brown and Goetzmann, 1995; Carhart et al., 2002), age (Brown and 
Goetzmann, 1995; Lunde et al., 1999), style (Horst et al., 2001; Bu and Lacey, 2009), expense 
ratios (Carhart et al., 2002; Bu and Lacey, 2009) or incentives (Massa and Patgiri, 2009), among 
others. The interest in prior performance and risk as predictors of fund failure has migrated to the 
hedge funds literature. In their analysis, Liang and Park (2010) consider different risk measures 
to adjust performance. They show that semi-deviation, value-at-risk, conditional value-at-risk, 
expected shortfall and tail risk are better predictors than standard deviation (especially the latter 
two).  
Other studies, such as Chapman et al. (2008) and Ng (2008), develop models aiming at 
forecasting hedge fund failure. They use the same performance metrics mentioned in the 
literature devoted to mutual fund analysis. Darolles et al. (2014) focus on the dependence in the 
liquidation risk. They consider two aspects: exogenous stochastic factors that can have a mutual 
influence in the liquidation intensities of the individual funds, and are often called frailties 
(Duffie et al., 2009). They can explain the high likelihood to observe a high percentage of default 
at a given date. On the other hand, a contagion effect appears when an event on a fund has an 
impact on other funds – for instance funds invested in other funds. It can be an answer to time 
series dependence on fund failure: high intensity in the closing during a given period followed by 
a high intensity during the next period. 
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In this paper, we refer to the intuition that past performance would naturally stand as a 
primary determinant of the decision to shut down a mutual fund. At the same time, we 
acknowledge that the literature on performance measurement has considerably evolved since the 
seminal studies in the field, and wish to take advantage of this progress. Our study aims to 
systematically investigate the drivers of past performance and to detect whether a multi-
dimensional representation of a fund’s performance reveals helpful in predicting its survival. We 
make full use of the spectrum of performance measures rather than sticking to the most classical 
and/or popular ones. By doing so, we investigate a specific research hypothesis: do the reasons 
for shutting down a fund go beyond the mere perception of past performance by investors – 
which would be the case if only a few set of measures sufficed to explain fund failure – or are 
they more likely related to the intrinsic qualities of the fund manager, as represented by a more 
sophisticated and multi-dimensional array of performance metrics? 
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper dedicated to the comprehensive analysis 
of the predictive properties of performance measures for fund survival. Our focus on forecasting 
the probability of survivorship rather than on persistence in performance is motivated by a 
hierarchical concern. For an investor, it is much more important to be able to anticipate a fund’s 
death than to be able to pick superior future performers, because the consequences of making the 
wrong bet are far more penalizing in the first case. Consistent with this objective, we concentrate 
our analysis on the detection of the best predictive association of performance measures as a 
whole, rather than on the economic and statistical significance of each individual predictor. For 
the same reason, we develop and test our model with non-overlapping time windows. This leads 
us to consider its in-sample fitting quality as well as its out-of-sample predictive capacity. 
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Our comprehensive analysis also introduces three improvements over previous studies, 
namely the use of weekly data, the coverage of different international fund markets1, and the 
consideration of dependence between liquidation times. Finally, we also distinguish the reason 
for a fund’s disappearance and examine the predictability in specific market segments and 
conditions.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and the construction of 
variables. In Section 3, we analyze the link between a fund’s past performance and its probability 
of disappearance. Section 4 presents the concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data and variable construction 
2.1. Mutual fund and market data 
2.1.1. Mutual fund data 
We exploit a database of weekly2 returns for 2,794 open-ended accumulation3 mutual funds with 
major or full allocation in equities on a worldwide basis. The time window ranges from Friday 
                                                 
1
 Most of the research focuses on US data or other national markets (e.g. Australia in Cameron and Hall (2003) and 
Sawicki (2001), and the United Kingdom in Lunde et al. (1999)). 
2
 The choice of weekly data represents a compromise between the superior ability to detect market timing effects 
with higher frequency data (“Our results motivate the use of daily data in future tests of mutual fund performance“, 
Bollen and Busse, 2001) and evidence of higher potential bias due to benchmark misspecification with the use of 
daily fund returns (Coles et al., 2006). In parallel, we face a problem of operational efficiency. Many measures are 
regression-based, preventing the use of monthly data for short time windows. On the other hand, weekly data permits 
a quicker and therefore more precise detection of the delisting, inducing better precision when building the logistic 
function, and a more reactive and realistic impact portfolio rebalancing. 
7 
December 30th 1994 to Friday January 8th 2010, so 15 years of returns. We extend the sample to 
July 2011 in order to gather observations of each fund’s survival or attrition posterior to the data 
period. Returns are extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream4.  
The database is further contaminated with a number of potential sources of interferences. To 
mitigate their effects, we apply the following filters: (i) we exclude from the sample all funds for 
which the missing data or variability in the series of weekly prices are potentially suspicious. All 
funds having missing data in their price series, at least three times three consecutive identical 
prices, or at least eight times two consecutive identical prices, are rejected; (ii) if the shares of a 
fund have once been divided or regrouped, we recalculate the whole series of prices starting from 
the day of the event, to ensure coherency in the series; (iii) we perform a global check of the 
plausibility of the prices: in particular, for a dozen of cases, a manual research has been done to 
fix some prices in the series; (iv) we eliminate 140 “cousin” funds, by regressing the returns of 
funds suspected to be similar, and excluding one of them when the correlation is higher than 
80%; (v) a return-based style analysis enables us to eliminate some funds invested in bonds or in 
short-term fixed income securities; and (vi) to obtain homogeneity in the asset pricing 
specifications used to compute multiple performance measures, we keep only the funds 
denominated in the five most important currencies (i.e. GBP, EUR, USD, CHF and JPY). 
                                                                                                                                                              
3
 The type of the fund is cross-checked through a manual research in Bloomberg. We avoid the issue of the 
distribution of dividends, which may have a tax impact for investors in different countries, by restricting the sample 
to only open-ended accumulation funds without stated initial maturity. 
4
 Because of the international character of the study, we preferred relying on a single database instead of mixing non-
US data from Thomson Reuters Datastream with the survivorship bias-free CRSP Mutual Fund database. 
Nevertheless, we manually ran a number of probes to ensure the consistency of data retrieved from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream with the corresponding CRSP returns. 
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This leaves us with a final sample of 1,624 funds: 705 in GBP, 663 in EUR, 200 in USD, 30 
in JPY and 26 in CHF5. Considering the country of domiciliation, we get 695 funds issued from 
the United Kingdom, 405 from Luxembourg, 178 from France, 114 from Italy, 89 from Belgium 
and 58 from Austria6. Other countries (Switzerland, Germany, Ireland, Liechtenstein, USA and 
Virgin Islands) are present in less than 50 funds. Summary statistics about these 1,624 funds are 
given in Table 1. 
[ Insert Table 1 approximately here ] 
Even though the sample period encompasses the 2007-08 crisis, average yearly returns are 
positive. They are higher for funds denominated in GBP or issued in the United Kingdom, but 
lower for Austrian and even negative in JPY. Standard deviations are in the neighborhood of 20% 
for all currencies. Skewness is always negative, and kurtosis is very positive.  
The last row indicates the frequency at which the hypothesis of normally distributed returns 
can be rejected at the 5% confidence level using the Jarque-Bera statistic. More than 95% of the 
funds exhibit a pattern leading to the rejection of the null. Thus, performance measures solely 
based on the mean-variance framework are likely to produce inaccurate outputs for most funds. 
The use of a larger array of performance measures for these funds is warranted. 
                                                 
5
 The condition on accumulation excludes a large number of funds denominated in USD, which explains their lower 
presence, but the sample size remains sufficient to draw statistical inferences. 
6
 We are aware that a fund’s administrative domicile does not necessarily indicate that the fund is managed in the 
same country. For instance, Luxembourg is renowned for being a popular place for fund administration, but few 
managers are headquartered in this country. Nevertheless, the country of a fund’s administration is still important 
information regarding its propensity to survive, as the legal, tax, and service environment can also bring significant 
differences in the decision to liquidate, merge or delist a fund exhibiting disappointing performance. 
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The database reports 978 live funds at the end of the pricing period, which even shrinks to 
only 856 (52.7%) if we consider a snapshot 18 months later. For the 769 defunct funds, we make 
a manual search on Bloomberg or with internet sources to retrieve the reason for delisting. We 
distinguish the following reasons for a fund ceasing to report returns7: (a) the fund has merged by 
absorption with another fund; (b) the fund has been liquidated; (c) the fund has become inactive 
for another reason; (d) the fund is still alive but has been delisted from the database. 
Table 2 partitions delisted funds by year, currency, country and delisting type. 
[ Insert Table 2 approximately here ] 
The percentage of graveyard funds is higher for those denominated in GBP and USD, and 
incorporated in the UK and Luxembourg. It is much lower for Belgian and Italian funds. 
The main two reasons for disappearance of a fund are its merger with another fund and its 
liquidation. We also find evidence of more mergers for GBP and USD funds, or issued in the UK 
and Luxembourg. There are proportionally more liquidations in Austria and Luxembourg.  
Very few funds disappeared before 2002. Markets were very bullish (dot-com bubble) until 
2000, and few funds die when their returns are positive even with a disappointing performance. 
2.1.2. Market data 
To determine the risk-free rate, we consider the 3 months Treasury Bill in the currency of the 
fund. When it is available, we use the main stock index of the country where a fund was issued, 
as proxy for the market. In the case of small countries, like Liechtenstein, we take the index of 
the most important neighbor country – or the average of the neighbor countries, in the case of 
                                                 
7
 In most cases, we find the exact delisting date of the fund. If such information is not available from our multiple 
sources, we consider the last reported price date as the one of disappearance. Considering all funds for which we get 
the information, the difference in days between the last price and the disappearance is lower than 7 days in the 
majority of the cases. Details are available upon request. 
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Luxembourg. Inflation rates8 of the involved countries are retrieved from various official sources 
of information, mainly Central Banks and Eurostat. 
Some performance measures, like the Information ratio, the Generalized Black-Treynor ratio 
or the Total risk alpha, either require the specification of a return generating process or the 
identification of a benchmark portfolio for the fund under review. We adopt the return-based 
style analysis framework proposed by Sharpe (1992). There are two reasons for this choice. First, 
this approach leads to superior benchmark definition over self-reported benchmarks for many 
funds. Second, we can define a benchmark for all funds, including absolute or total return funds, 
which is necessary in order to produce a large number of performance measures. 
We select 41 indexes9 representative of most of the world markets. A part of them is 
geographical delimited, including North American, European, Asian, and emerging markets; we 
also consider index restrained to small or mid or large capitalizations. The remaining ones are 
sector indexes, gold and oil. To determine the benchmark of each fund, we then apply the strong 
form style analysis (Sharpe, 1992), considering the 41 index returns converted in the fund’s home 
currency, and a 42nd index which is the risk free rate in the same currency. The selection of style 
indexes for each fund is refined using the procedure described by Lobosco and DiBartolomeo 
(1997). We implement it by the following process: 
- As a first step, we regress the returns of the fund on the 42 potential benchmarks, to 
determine 42 positive weights. We compute the standard deviation of those weights and set 
the 95% confidence interval for each weight. From this first step, we retain all indexes having 
a strictly positive weight and an upper bound greater than 10%. 
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 Inflation rates present strong seasonal variations, so we compute systematically the yearly mobile average. 
9
 The complete list of selected indexes is available upon request. 
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- We reiterate the procedure with the selected set of indexes. For all further steps, we keep all 
potential benchmarks having a strictly positive weight and an upper bound greater than 20%. 
- We stop the process when no index exits from the list or when there remain only two indexes 
– one of them being the risk free one. 
2.2. Computation of performance measures 
Cogneau and Hübner (2009 and 2009a) report more than one hundred portfolio performance 
measures developed in the academic and practitioner’s literature. We select about 70 of those 
measures and compute them on the sample of funds. For parametric measures, we consider 
multiple variations. For instance, we often consider three variants when a reference return is 
needed: risk-free rate, inflation rate, zero percent; we compute measures using the Value-at-Risk 
or the Conditional Value-at-Risk with different thresholds; different values of the parameters are 
used to reflect the price of the risk or the investor’s style, in measures like Farinelli-Tibiletti ratio, 
Sharpe’s alpha or Aftalion and Poncet’s index10. This leads us to the computation of 147 
performance measures, whose detailed list can be found in the Appendix11. 
We compute the linear returns and then the 147 measures over various time scales (annual, 
from one to five years), considering moving windows rolling every week over the full sample 
period. This yields a maximum of 14 x 52 x 147 = 107,016 individual one-year performance 
estimates for a fund with full history. We finalize this step of computation by centering and 
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 The complete parameterization of these variations and the source documents are available upon request. 
11
 The computation of alphas with conditional models require lagged values of some macroeconomic variables; as 
Christopherson et al. (1999), we retain the yield spread (spread between the 10 years and the 3 months interest rates) 
and the credit spread (spread between BAA and AAA rated corporate bonds); as third variable, we considered the 
inflation rate (see Chen et al. 1986; Ferson and Harvey, 1995); finally, we add the volatility (Bollerslev et al., 2011) 
represented by the VIX index. 
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standardizing each measure, to get their normalized versions. These values will be used in the 
forthcoming analysis. 
2.3. Selection and processing of relevant performance measures 
To eliminate the redundancies showing up in the series of 147 of computed performance 
estimates, we proceed as follows. For each year, we compute the matrix of Kendall’s rank 
correlations between the 147 measures. Then, we build an average of the 15 yearly matrices, and 
remove all collinear measures with a stepwise elimination procedure. The set of remaining 
measures have two-by-two correlations that do not exceed 85%12. About two thirds of the 
measures are rejected. Table 3 summarizes the classes of the 56 remaining measures. 
[ Insert Table 3 approximately here ] 
The main distinctive aspects of performance emphasized in the taxonomy presented in 
Cogneau and Hübner (2009 and 2009a) show up in the results: market timing (alphas and 
gammas of Treynor-Mazuy and Henriksson-Merton); preference-based (prospect ratio, Stutzer 
index); return-based ratios (Sharpe ratios based on VaR and CVaR, variations of Sortino and 
Information ratios, Generalized Black-Treynor ratio…); gain-based ratios (Farinelli-Tibiletti 
ratio, Rachev ratio…); return-based differences (M2 and various alphas: Jensen, Fama & French, 
total risk); and gain-based differences (Fouse index). The control for systematic risk is clearly 
distinguished from the non-systematic one, as we retain both the Modified Jensen and Moses, 
Cheney & Veit’s measures. 
When a variation of a measure takes skewness and kurtosis into account, it is often selected. 
As a consequence, some of the most classical measures, as Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio, Sortino 
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 We also process computations with thresholds of 80% and 90%, with no significant difference in the results 
(available upon request). 
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ratio, are discarded in their original form. Enhanced measures seem thus to be more appropriate 
in the framework of a predictive analysis. 
With the 56 potential measures, we define dummy variables corresponding to the quintiles of 
the selected measures. This treatment enables us to perform quintile regression. Koenker and 
Hallock (2001) show that quintile variables allow considering different effects along the 
distribution of the dependent variables. This enables to match a non-homogeneous relation with 
the independent variable (saturation effect, S-shaped curve…). Quintile regression is also more 
robust to outliers.13 
2.4. Introduction of contagion and frailty variables 
The methodology described in next section assumes implicitly the independence of individual 
delisting times. However, we check the uniformity over time of the delisting distributions 
through a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and the uniformity is rejected at the 95% threshold. This 
leads us to complement the performance measures with additional independent variables that 
could adequately proxy for the time-clustering of attrition events.  
In the context of hedge funds, Darolles et al. (2014) explore the dependence in the 
liquidation risk and emphasize two causes of liquidation risk dependencies. On the one hand, the 
high likelihood of observing a high percentage of delistings during a given period can find its 
origin in underlying exogenous factors having a common influence on the liquidation risks of the 
individual funds. They call these factors frailties. On the other hand, a high percentage of funds 
attrition during a certain time interval immediately followed by a high proportion of subsequent 
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 We have also used the performance measures themselves, but the results appear to be less significant both in- and 
out-of-sample. The results are available upon request. 
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delistings can be explained by a contagion phenomenon: a shock to one fund has an impact on 
the other funds that belong to the same class. 
To represent these phenomena within our modelling approach, we introduce two series of 
variables, measured at a given time t. The first one is the percentage of funds in the whole sample 
that closed during the lagged period [t-τ,t[. This variable proxies for the frailty effect. The second 
one is the percentage of funds that closed during the last period in a given class, defined as the 
group of funds that share the same primary index in the constitution of their benchmark (see 
section 2.1). This second variable stands for the contagion effect. Regarding the duration of the 
lagged period covered by these two variables, we consider the three following lengths τ: one 
week, one month (4 weeks), and one quarter (13 weeks).  
 
3. The link between fund performance and subsequent disappearance 
We apply our approach on the global sample of funds. Next, we study the past performance as 
determinant of the predictability of fund disappearance, by type of fund death, country of 
incorporation, currency of denomination and by market trend. 
3.1. Methodology 
To analyze the potential link between the performance of a fund and its disappearance, we 
execute a logistic regression, where the independent variables are the frailty and contagion 
variables defined in subsection 2.4, the quintile variables corresponding to the selected 56 













where τi is the time of disappearance of fund i, T is the length of the prediction period, in years (T 
= 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 or 1.5), h is the horizon for prior performance measurement, in years (h = 1, 
2, 3, 4 or 5), Π,;is the vector of quintile dummies for the selected performance measures, and 
αh,T and B’h,T are the estimated coefficients of the regression. 
To check the significance of the results, we consider Somers’ D14 as a synthetic indicator of 
the ability of the performance measures to predict the disappearance time of the fund (Somers, 
1962). This statistic has a geometric interpretation15 similar to the Gini coefficient in the context 
of the logistic regression: if we divide it by 2 and we add 0.5, we obtain Harrell’s c statistic, 
which is the area below the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. 
We build the model of the logistic regression with a stepwise algorithm with forward 
variable selection (see e.g. Butera and Faff (2006), Hu and Ansell (2007), Niklis et al. (2012)). 
We start by ranking Somers’ D for each measure considered individually in a logistic regression. 
We build a first model with only one measure – the one with the highest individual Somers’ D – 
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 This indicator, computed on the binary outcome, is intensively used in credit risk (see for instance Laitinen (1999) 
or Melnik and Plaut (1996)) to quantify the capacity of the estimated risk score in discriminating the defaulting 
versus the non-defaulting entities. An alternative is the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. However, this test is 
not usable with our large database as Paul et al. (2013) have reported that in very large data sets (n > 25,000), small 
departures from the proposed model will be considered significant. 
15
 Somers’s D is computed as follows: S = (C – D) /(C + D + T) where C is the number of concordant pairs, D is the 
number of discordant pairs and T is the number of tied pairs (pairs of observations that have equal values of 
observations or equal values of predictions). A pair of observations with different observed responses is said to be 
concordant if the observation with the lower ordered response value has a lower predicted mean score than the 
observation with the higher ordered response value. If the observation with the lower ordered response value has a 
higher predicted mean score than the observation with the higher ordered response value, then the pair is discordant. 
If the pair is neither concordant nor discordant, it is tied. 
16 
and compute the Schwarz Criterion (SC) of this model. Then, we loop on the 55 remaining 
measures, by decreasing16 individual Somers’ D. At each step, a new measure is added in the 
model and a new logistic regression is executed. If the Schwarz Criterion increases, the variable 
is rejected. If the Schwarz criterion decreases but the weight of the measure is not significant 
enough (level set at 20%), we check the evolution of the Somers’ D: if it does not increase, the 
variable is also rejected. 
We ensure the robustness of our model by cutting the sample in two sub-samples of similar 
sizes: one for the training of the model (“modeling group”), the second as a validation group. The 
algorithm that builds the two subsamples guarantees that the number of records for each currency 
and each country are about the same17. In order to avoid contagion in the data when applying the 
model on the validation group, we ensure that all instances of a fund are present in the same 
subsample. 
To avoid a bias in the comparison of models with different length in the performance period, 
we consider the same periods for the predictions, starting from January 2000. It means that the 
first performance periods start in 1999 for one-year performance, and in 1995 when performance 
is measured over five years. As a second step, the same process is re-executed, starting with first 
models that include not only one measure but also the frailty and contagion variable as defined in 
subsection 2.4. 
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 For the first four iterations, we add a condition on the selected measure: its correlation with the measures already 
in the model must be under a predefined threshold – this is to ensure a sufficient variety of the selected measures. 
17
 Detailed statistics of the number of funds in the modeling and validation groups, by duration of observation period, 
by country, by currency, by duration until the disappearance, and by attrition type are available upon request. 
17 
3.2. Global results 
Our results on the global sample18 are summarized in Table 4. 
[ Insert Table 4 approximately here ] 
The values displayed in Table 4 suggest that the disappearance of a fund is largely 
predictable according to its past performance19. In general, the longer the observed period, the 
better the prediction becomes. This tendency can be explained by the condition on survivorship 
over the performance measurement horizon: by restricting the sample of eligible funds to the 
ones that had been existing for a longer period, their likelihood of surviving longer is reinforced. 
Up to four years are enough to get a good picture of past performance in the modeling 
group20. If we consider the validation sample, an observation period of three years is optimal. 
This is consistent with the finding of Lunde et al. (1999) that the performance over the previous 
three years matters more for a fund’s closure probability than its performance over the past year.  
The introduction of the contagion and frailty variables computed over the previous quarter21 
strongly improves the model for short durations of the performance period. Beyond three years 
however, the added value of the frailty and contagion variables becomes marginal: it is largely 
subsumed by the performance measures for three years or more, which appear to capture the 
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 We also process the same computations considering subsets of the whole sample, keeping only one period on four 
(monthly starts) or one period on thirteen (quarterly starts). The results remain essentially unaltered. 
19
 We compute the confidence interval for the Somers’s D, using the method of Newson (2006): due to the large 
number of records in the sample, the size of the confidence interval at 95% is almost always less than 0.005. The 
values indicated in Table 4 and the subsequent ones are therefore highly significant. 
20
 Increasing the measurement horizon to 5 years leads to a reduction of the model accuracy for both sub-samples. 
21
 The explanatory power of the same variables on shorter durations (one week or one month) is smaller (results not 
reported here but available upon request). 
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dependencies between individual liquidation times. In other words, the funds’ past performance 
over long horizons seems to act as a predictor of their tendency to disappear by clusters, and so 
the frailty and contagion variables become largely redundant. 
Regarding the duration of the disappearance prediction period, no clear trend emerges. The 
quality of the prediction is almost the same, whether the observation period is three months or 
higher. More precisely, without the inclusion of the contagion and frailty variables, it decreases 
slowly with the length of the prediction period in the modeling sample, and it increases at a 
similar rate in the validation sample. As the influence of contagion and frailty is more 
pronounced for shorter periods, the predictability of models including these effects decreases as 
the duration increases. 
Panel C of Table 4 reports that on average, slightly less than one half of the potential 
measures are kept in the final specification. This number increases with the duration of the 
disappearance period. Reported results confirm the higher predictive power of contagion and 
frailty for shorter durations.  
In Table 5, looking more closely into the parameter estimates for the retained measures in the 
best case for the validation sample (i.e. performance horizon h is 3 years, disappearance period T 
19 
is 12 months), return-based measures have the most important weight22 in the predictive power of 
the model. Conversely, market timing measures reflect a negative persistence.23 
[ Insert Table 5 approximately here ] 
Considering the frailty and contagion variables, the positive sign of the coefficient for the 
contagion and the negative sign for the frailty leads us to the conclusion that contagion effects, 
which reflect a more concentrated clustering effect, have a more important impact than frailties. 
Figure 1 displays the ROC curves for the modeling sample and for the validation sample, in 
the same case (h = 3, T = 1, inclusion of contagion and frailty variables). The diagonal 
corresponds to the random pick. The graph provides a visual correspondence of the values taken 
by Somers’ D of 0.423 and 0.333 provided in Table 4, which corresponds to the values 0.712 and 
0.667 for Harrell’s c. The area under the ROC curve for the modeling sample amounts to more 
than 70% of the total size of the box. We also emphasize the smoothness of this curve, which 
indicates that the quality of the prediction remains stable throughout the sample. The value of the 
logistic function depicted in equation (1) is almost proportional to the probability of 
disappearance. 
[ Insert Figure 1 approximately here ] 
                                                 
22
 As the target value of the logistic regression is +1 for the delisted funds, a negative coefficient for a measure 
means that it has a good positive predictive power. 
23
 We consider further the differences of measures (relative and absolute change) as potential independent variables. 
It is well documented in the domain of credit risk modeling, which is relatively close to ours, that the inclusion of 
differences in parameters often gives better results. This extension is justified by the conjecture of a similar effect 
appearing here. Even though the inclusion of absolute and relative difference in performance measures increase the 
Somers’ D in the modeling sample, the results become generally poorer in the validation sample for horizons longer 
than two years, suggesting an overfitting phenomenon (detailed results are available on request).  
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3.3.  Specific aspects of predictability 
3.3.1. Prediction by reason for disappearance 
Three potential reasons are reported for the disappearance of a fund: “liquidation”, “merger”, 
“inactivity”, and funds for which no justification are given being classified as “other”. The latter 
two categories being very marginal, we group them with the first one for further analysis. 
We first examine whether predictability is more or less pronounced according to whether 
delisting is due to liquidation or another form of fund freeze. While the first category of events 
eventually corresponds to fund death, the merger case entails that the money still remains 
invested in the fund, but through an absorbing vehicle. It is interesting to study to what extent 
past performance explains the distinction among survivors between live and absorbed funds. 
[ Insert Table 6 approximately here ] 
The predictable character of fund disappearance already observed in Table 4 is confirmed in 
panel A of Table 6. Partitioning the sample increases predictability, especially for mergers. For 
instance, the quality of the prediction (represented by Harrell’s c) of a merger when performance 
is measured over a 3-year horizon exceeds 75% for time windows of 12 months.  
Not only the predictability of liquidation vs. merger differs, but we also note that different 
dimensions of performance influence the forecasts. Panel B of Table 6 compares the predictive 
power of the different classes of measures. Preference-based measures are highly predictive for 
mergers, while their forecasting power is smaller in the liquidation case. Conversely, the 
predictive power of market timing gammas is higher for liquidation than for mergers. 
3.3.2. Predictability for classical measures 
The use of such a large number of classical performance measures opens up the way to two types 
of biases: the possibility of data mining and the excessive importance given to irrelevant 
performance measures. To mitigate them, we restrict the sample to a limited subset of measures 
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whose selection is based on a qualitative assessment of their relevance and/or their popularity. 
For this purpose, we adopt 10 measures. By alphabetical order, these are: Bernardo-Ledoit ratio 
(aka Omega), Fama & French alpha, Henriksson-Merton gamma, Jensen’s alpha, MorningStar 
(risk coefficient of 3), Moses Cheney & Veit’s measure, Rachev ratio (parameters equal 0.05 and 
0.05), Sharpe ratio, Sortino ratio (risk-free rate as reserve return), and Treynor ratio. 
We first perform a logistic regression with each of these measures individually, computed on 
a period h of 3 years, as independent variable, and the disappearance (all five durations T, as in 
Table 3) of the fund as dependent variable. In a second step, we combine these 10 measures in a 
logistic regression where they are all considered as independent variables. The results are 
reported in the left side of Table 7. 
[ Insert Table 7 approximately here ] 
Compared with the value for Somers’ D obtained in Table 4, some measures provide 
reasonable predictability: the Bernardo-Ledoit ratio, Fama & French alpha, MorningStar, Sharpe 
ratio, Sortino ratio and Treynor ratio, often obtain a D estimate exceeding 0.25. It is noteworthy 
that a very popular regression intercept, Jensen’s alpha, is powerless, even though some other 
measures based on the same one-factor specification, like the Treynor ratio, are relevant. Taken 
altogether, the D index increases to values above 0.3, which are however lower than those 
obtained with the full set of measures (see Table 4). For instance, when the forecasting horizon is 
6 months, the loss in accuracy in predictability amounts to (0.414 – 0.323)/2 = 4.5% for the 
modeling sample and to (0.329 – 0.287)/2 = 2.1% for the validation sample. 
The right side of Table 7 reports the results for the same measures, but including the frailty 
and the contagion variables in the models. Compared to the reported results of Table 4, the 
Somers’ D are substantially higher even for the model that combines all classical measures. This 
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indicates that altogether, the classical measures taken individually are unable to capture the 
dependencies between individual liquidation times. 
3.3.3. Predictability for subsets of funds 
Finally, we examine whether the forecasting power of the logistic regression differs for different 
types of funds. We analyze two dimensions. The first one is the currency of denomination, and 
the second one is the country of domiciliation. We restrict the presentation of results in Table 8 to 
a horizon of three years for the performance measurement, to models including the contagion and 
frailty variables, to currencies EUR and GBP, and to countries UK and LU – which represent 
more than two thirds of the funds. 
[ Insert Table 8 approximately here ] 
Splitting the sample by currencies substantially increases the predictability. We get a strong 
set of values for funds denominated in EUR, but lower for funds denominated in GBP. The 
disappearance of euro-denominated funds remains largely predictable, both in the modeling and 
the validation samples, for all periods. Past performance appears thus to play an essential role in 
their delisting, but the decision to shut down the funds, be it because of large redemptions or 
because of a decision taken by the promoters, can take a relatively long time.  
Panel B of Table 8 shows that the predictability of disappearance for funds that are 
incorporated in Luxembourg – typically denominated in USD or EUR – does not decay with the 
length of the test window. Such mutual funds, which are mostly regulated by the successive EU 
UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) Directives, benefit 
from a much higher than average predictability irrespective of the period. This might be due to 
the fact that the level of standardization of their information disclosure, imposed by the EU 
regulations to get the European passport, makes their performance easily comparable across 
countries and fund types. For instance, the Key Investor Information Document (KIID) imposes 
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all UCITS to deliver a Synthetic Risk-and-Reward Indicator (SRRI) on the basis of the five-year 
volatility of past returns. Investors can thus base their investment/divestment decisions on 
elements that intervene in the determination of risk-adjusted performance. 
3.3.4. Predictability when considering the market trends 
We also attempt to improve the ability of the model to predict a fund’s delisting by considering 
the market trend during its performance period. To implement this test, we compute the 
difference between the average market return and the risk-free rate for every performance period 
and on each market. The period is considered as bullish when the difference is positive and 
bearish otherwise24. Then, we carry out two logistic regressions, one per market trend. 
[ Insert Table 9 approximately here ] 
Table 9 reveals that the predictability is much higher when the trend of the market in taken 
into account, in particular for funds issued in EUR. It is coherent with King and Wadhwani 
(1990) who point that, during crisis periods, cross-market correlations between asset returns 
increase significantly. This is especially visible in the modeling sample. Predictability in the 
modeling sample improves on bullish markets, but remains high in the validation sample for 
euro-denominated funds. This Table also confirms that the predictability is more difficult for 
funds issued in GBP. For this currency, it even becomes impossible to predict fund delisting on 
bullish markets for the validation sample, which indicates that the determinants of a fund’s 
disappearance have little to do with past performance for GBP-denominated funs.  
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 This definition of the market conditions is used by Kim and Zumwalt (1979) and by Chen (1982). 
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3.4. Investment implications 
We now investigate the economic importance of our previous results. As an acid test of the 
importance of the predictability of a fund’s disappearance, it should permit investors to increase 
their rate of return by basing their investment in a pool of mutual funds on such information. 
We consider the performance25 on three years26, and we classify funds in five quintiles, 
based on the score given by the logistic function, when predicting the disappearance in the next 
12 months. For each quintile, we build a portfolio of equally weighted funds with an initial value 
of 1,000 and record its return at the end of the year. If a fund delists in the meantime, we take the 
return till the date of its disappearance, and apply a penalty on the last reporting date. This 
penalty is supposed to represent the expenses needed for the closing of the fund: auditing and 
legal fees, communication expenses, liquidation expenses… We test a set of these penalties 
ranging from 0 to 100%, with a special focus on values below 5%27. At the end of the year, we 
rebalance the five portfolios using the new score of the regression analysis, and we compute their 
returns in the same way. 
As our database starts end December 1994 and ends in January 2010, the first portfolios are 
built in January 1998, the last one are built in January 2009, and we consider 12 waves.  
[ Insert Figure 2 approximately here ] 
                                                 
25
 Contrarily to the standardization procedure applied when building the logistic models, in which the whole sample 
of performance measures was considered, the normalization procedure applied for portfolio formation only considers 
past information, available at the moment of rebalancing the portfolios.  
26
 Discussions with some asset managers indicate that three years is a consensual horizon of performance among 
professionals for their fund selection. 
27
 The exact level of this penalty is difficult to estimate. Discussions with professionals indicate that it should be 
around 5%. The highest costs reside in case of liquidation, when assets are sold at an often discounted price. 
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Figure 2, built with figures for a penalty level of 5% for disappearing funds, indicates that 
the final value of the highest quintile portfolio (Q5) is substantially higher than all others. We 
report in Table 10 detailed values of the returns on the whole period, for ten different levels of 
penalty. If we consider a reasonable penalty of 2%, the highest quintile provides a terminal value 
of 1,882, corresponding to a compound return of 5.38%, while the lowest (Q1) provides 4.28% 
(final value of 1,659). The compound return of the Q5 portfolio remains at 4.97% even when a 
(largely overestimated) penalty of 20% per delisted fund is applied, while it drops to 2.85% for 
Q1, which clearly indicates that the major source of performance difference between the 
portfolios lies in the capacity to anticipate a fund’s exit from the database. 
[ Insert Table 10 approximately here ] 
For comparison purpose, we also report the values for a naïve portfolio equally invested in 
all funds from the sample: its compound returns is hardly higher than the best from the portfolios 
in Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, and largely inferior to the compound return of Q5. 
The Sharpe ratios of the quintile and of the naïve portfolios, reported for two reasonable 
values of the penalty (0 and 5%), show that the highest quintile portfolio performs unequivocally 
best, according to the Jobson and Korkie (1981) test statistic. 
3.5. Comparison with other predictor types 
We now check the importance of our contribution, comparing the robustness of our results with 
models considering variables analyzed in previous papers, mainly the assets under management 
(AUM), age, and realized total returns.  
[ Insert Table 11 approximately here ] 
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We first consider the age and past returns (lagged 12 months) of the funds. We retrieve the 
inception date of 1,573 funds, forming a single sample28. Considering that persistence studies 
using these variables usually examine one-year or longer persistence, we apply the logistic 
regressions to predict each fund’s disappearance in the next twelve and eighteen months. We 
alternatively consider age and the logarithm of age. To make the estimation window consistent 
with the time frame of the computation of lagged returns, we restrict it to one year. 
Table 11 shows that the age and returns are indeed predictive, but much less than a model 
building on past performance, contagion and frailty when their Somers’ D with similar estimation 
and forecasting windows are compared. The logarithm of the age reveals a slightly better 
predictor than the age itself. Past returns have a greater ability to predict a fund’s delisting than 
age. Combinations of age and returns improve further the Somers’ D, but still far from the values 
of model based on prior performance measures, contagion and frailty. A combined model, 
featuring all predictors (performance, contagion, frailty, age and returns) turns out to achieve the 
highest Somers’ D. Altogether, evidence presented in Table 11 suggests that prior performance 
encompasses much of the information embedded in a fund’s age and past returns, while the 
opposite is not true. 
We consider next models based on the assets under management (AUM) of the funds. Over 
the considered period, we get 592,938 records from Bloomberg, concerning 1,108 funds. The 
series displays many anomalies and outliers. After a systematic check, we exclude abnormal data 
and remain with 585,515 observations. Most retrieved observations refer to the years 2001 or 
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 For the purpose of comparing predictability for different model specifications, one having few variables (age, 
AUM, returns) another one having many variables (performance measures), we do not need to split the sample in a 
modeling and a validation group. 
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later. The proportion of dead funds is smaller in this sample than in the original one, i.e. 30%, 
compared to 42% in Table 2.  
We first consider the prediction of disappearance using the AUM as the only forecasting 
variable. Table 11 reveals its low predictive power, displaying Somers’ D values of about 10%, at 
a similar level as age, and much weaker than 30% with a model consisting of performance 
measures29. Introducing the variables examined in previous section indicates limited 
complementarity. Altogether, they deliver Somers’ D around 20%. Models that combine 
performance measures and AUM improve the quality of the forecasts, although not to a 
substantial extent. Completing these variables with age and prior returns does not bring any 
noteworthy added value.  
In sum, models based on performance measures have a predictive power largely superior to 
models using classical variables, like the AUM and the age of the funds. Adding them only 
slightly increases the power of the models based on performance measures. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Even though the central role of past performance has been emphasized as a determinant of the 
ability of a mutual fund to survive over time, the investigation of the dimensions of performance 
that influence this ability has been long neglected. Besides a fund’s excess returns or its intercept 
of multi-factor asset pricing models, very few alternative performance measures have been used 
to explain its likelihood to disappear. This lack of interest probably results from the scarce 
                                                 
29
 We consider the variation of AUM in the last period (one year, six months, three months and one month): the 
predictive power of this variation is null. This is consistent with Brown and Goetzmann (1995) who find that new 
money is not a predictor. Values are therefore not reported. 
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interest shown amongst scholars towards the development of new performance measures over 
that last two decades.  
We believe that many fund managers do not only attempt to derive their performance from 
their generation of alphas over a standardized asset pricing model. In the context of hedge funds, 
which can be seen as laboratories of novel fund management techniques, Liang and Park (2010) 
document that alternative risk measures related to skewed and leptokurtic distributions of returns 
are indeed good predictors of the fate of a fund. Many of their managers exhibit differential skills 
in the management of their total, systematic or specific risks, and some of them address investors 
with various profiles. Naturally, they tend to be judged on the basis of their delivery of a 
consistent performance. The case for a wide array of performance measures as explanatory 
determinants of fund survivorship is, from our point of view, warranted.  
Our paper has shown that our claim can be, to a reasonable extent, empirically validated. By 
a careful calibration and reduction of performance metrics, and by the integration of parameters 
quantifying the dependence in the individual liquidation times, our discriminant analysis shows a 
significant ability of past performance to predict future survival. Of course, these findings ought 
to be refined and many robustness checks can also be performed. In particular, as the proof of the 
pudding is in the eating, we have to carry out an out-of-sample analysis showing the actual 
consequences of conditioning portfolio allocation decisions to the suspicion of a fund’s 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the funds returns 
Panel A – Statistics by currency of denomination 
 ALL CHF EUR GBP JPY USD 
Nb. of funds 1,624 26 663 705 30 200 
mean Nb. of obs. 555 556 558 560 597 520 
Mean weekly return 0.090% 0.050% 0.054% 0.130% -0.015% 0.092% 
Mean yearly return 4.70% 2.60% 2.83% 6.73% -0.79% 4.79% 
Mean yearly std.dev. 20.6% 20.0% 20.9% 19.2% 22.0% 23.9% 
Mean skewness -0.42 -0.48 -0.40 -0.45 -0.33 -0.40 
Mean Exc. Kurtosis 3.92 5.56 4.32 3.45 2.96 4.20 
% Jarque-Bera at 5% 95.69% 88.46% 97.13% 95.32% 86.67% 94.50% 
 
Panel B – Statistics by country of incorporation 
 AT BE FR UK IT LU Others 
Nb. of funds 58 89 178 695 114 405 85 
mean Nb. of obs. 526 652 555 559 680 511 481 
Mean weekly return 0.026% 0.083% 0.079% 0.130% 0.083% 0.047% 0.054% 
Mean yearly return 1.36% 4.34% 4.12% 6.78% 4.32% 2.43% 2.80% 
Mean yearly std.dev. 20.3% 22.3% 21.3% 19.3% 17.8% 22.6% 21.9% 
Mean skewness -0.46 -0.59 -0.37 -0.45 -0.41 -0.38 -0.33 
Mean Exc. Kurtosis 3.34 5.99 4.44 3.45 4.45 4.08 3.42 
% Jarque-Bera at 5% 91.38% 100.00% 98.88% 95.25% 98.25% 94.32% 94.12% 
 
This Table reports descriptive statistics for the linear returns of the 1,624 open-ended accumulation 
mutual funds with major or full allocation in equities. Prices are extracted for the period starting on Friday 
December 30th 1994 and ending on Friday January 8th 2010, from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Funds 
are grouped by currency of denomination (Panel A) and by country of incorporation (Panel B). The first 
lines report the numbers of funds, then the mean number of weekly observations. The following lines 
report the averages of the first four moments of the distributions, then the percentages of funds for which 
a Jarque-Bera test permits to reject the normality at a threshold of 95%. Currencies are: CHF = Swiss 
Franc; EUR = Euro (local currencies converted at parity before 1999); GBP = British Pound; JPY = Yen; 
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USD = U.S. Dollar. Countries are: AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; FR = France; UK = The United 
Kingdom; IT = Italy; LU = Luxembourg.  
36 
Table 2. Fund delistings per motive vs. country, currency and year 
Panel A – Motives of delisting per currency and country 
  Currency  Country 
 ALL CHF EUR GBP JPY USD  AT BE FR UK IT LU Oth 
merged 418 7 143 199 5 64  7 12 36 197 17 143 6 
 26% 27% 22% 28% 17% 32%  12% 13% 20% 28% 15% 35% 7% 
liquidated 257 4 127 82 5 39  12 1 25 77 2 90 50 
 16% 15% 19% 12% 17% 20%  21% 1% 14% 11% 2% 22% 59% 
inactive 82 0 17 59 0 6  2 1 8 59 0 9 3 
 5% 0% 3% 8% 0% 3%  3% 1% 4% 8% 0% 2% 4% 
delisted 12 0 0 11 0 1  0 0 0 11 0 1 0 
 1% 0% 0% 2% 0% 1%  0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 
ALL 769 11 287 351 10 110  21 14 69 344 19 243 59 
 47% 42% 43% 50% 33% 55%  36% 16% 39% 49% 17% 60% 69% 
 
 
This Table reports the number of delisted funds, by delisting type: merging, liquidation, inactivity and 
other delisting. Panel A reports the ventilation according to the currency of denomination and to the 
country of incorporation. Panel B reports the number of delistings per year: the first delistings happened 
in 1997 and we ceased the reporting in July 2011, 18 months after the last available prices. Data are 
reported for 1,624 open-ended accumulation mutual funds with major or full allocation in equities, 
extracted for the period starting on Friday December 30th 1994 and ending on Friday January 8th 2010, 
Panel B – Motives of delisting per year 
  Year 
 ALL 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
merged 418 2 1 13 15 38 37 113 70 16 12 18 10 10 37 36 
liquidated 257 0 0 1 9 9 16 45 37 35 19 15 11 17 25 18 
inactive 82 0 0 4 1 6 0 5 11 15 16 7 5 7 1 4 
delisted 12 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 
ALL 769 3 5 21 15 53 53 163 119 66 47 42 26 34 64 58 
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from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The date and the reason of the delisting are retrieved manually, 
mainly from Bloomberg.  
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Table 3. Summary of the selected performance measures by classes 
Class Count Proportion 
Market Timing Measures 15 26.8% 
alphas 7 12.5% 
gammas and delta 8 14.3% 
Return-based Ratios 15 26.8% 
Gain-based Ratios 11 19.6% 
Return-based Differences 9 16.1% 
Preference Based 5 8.9% 
Gain-based Differences 1 1.8% 
Total 56 100% 
 
This Table reports the classes of the 56 remaining measures, after the elimination of redundancies. This 
selection is obtained by considering the average of the 15 yearly matrixes of Kendall correlations between 
the 147 computed measures depicted in the Appendix; then, a stepwise elimination procedure keeps the 
set of measures whose two-by-two correlations do not exceed 85%. The denominations of the classes are 
based on Cogneau and Hübner (2009 and 2009a). 
39 
Table 4. Somers’ D statistic and number of variables in the model 
 
Panel A – Modeling sample 
 
  
Disappearance time T (years) 
 
      0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 average 
Performance horizon h 
(years) 
1 
meas. only 0.319 0.303 0.301 0.290 0.280 0.299 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 0.403 0.367 0.370 0.350 0.331 0.364 
2 meas. only 0.347 0.331 0.351 0.355 0.353 0.348 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 0.379 0.373 0.383 0.368 0.367 0.374 
3 
meas. only 0.402 0.396 0.418 0.414 0.403 0.407 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 0.403 0.404 0.420 0.423 0.401 0.410 
4 
meas. only 0.434 0.424 0.421 0.407 0.398 0.417 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 0.442 0.433 0.395 0.417 0.402 0.418 
  
average meas. only 
0.376 0.364 0.373 0.366 0.359 0.367 
 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 0.407 0.394 0.392 0.389 0.375 0.392 
 
       
Panel B – Validation sample 
 
 
Disappearance time T (years) 
 
    0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 average 
Performance horizon h 
(years) 
1 
meas. only 0.156 0.167 0.178 0.185 0.208 0.179 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 0.278 0.263 0.246 0.266 0.246 0.260 
2 
meas. only 0.251 0.243 0.287 0.290 0.303 0.275 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 0.336 0.329 0.323 0.309 0.323 0.324 
3 meas. only 0.289 0.326 0.328 0.329 0.318 0.318 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 0.311 0.334 0.335 0.333 0.319 0.326 
4 
meas. only 0.307 0.314 0.294 0.319 0.305 0.308 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 0.320 0.303 0.323 0.325 0.299 0.314 
  
average meas. only 
0.251 0.262 0.272 0.281 0.284 0.270 
 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 0.311 0.308 0.307 0.308 0.297 0.306 
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Panel C – Number of variables in the model 
 
 
Disappearance time T (years) 
 
    0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 average 
Performance horizon h 
(years) 
1 
meas. only 19 24 26 24 25 24 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 16 17 24 24 30 22 
2 
meas. only 21 27 29 29 28 27 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 25 26 30 30 32 29 
3 meas. only 22 17 27 30 35 26 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 19 18 23 33 35 26 
4 
meas. only 24 28 30 28 32 28 
meas. + fr. + ctg. 24 30 22 30 34 28 
  
  
meas. only 22 24 28 28 30 26 
  meas. + fr. + ctg. 21 23 25 29 33 26 
 
This Table reports the Somers’ D of the models built by a logistic regression where the potential independent variables are quintile dummy 
variables built on the 56 selected measures (“meas. only”), or on these 56 measures plus the proportion of funds closed during the last quarter for 
the whole sample (frailty or “fr.) and belonging to the same class (contagion or “ctg.”). Measures are entered one by one in the model, and an 
algorithm that considers the SC and the p-value of the weight determines whether a measure remains in the model (see main text for details of this 
algorithm). Values are reported for four performance horizons (ℎ = 1 year, 2 years, 3 years and 4 years) and four prediction periods T: 3 months, 6 
months, 12 months and 18 months. Panel A reports the values for the modeling sample and Panel B reports the values for the validation sample. 
Panel C reports the total number of measures (including eventually contagion and frailty) in the model. Average values of the Somers’ D and of 
the number of variables per performance horizon are reported on the right side and per disappearance time on the bottom of each panel. 
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Table 5. Logistic function for the best predictive scenario in the validation sample 
Class Measure name Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 
-3.163 0.000 
Return-based Ratios Sharpe_SK -1.338 0.000 
Return-based Ratios Isr_Roy_ifl -0.409 0.000 
Return-based Ratios Sterling -0.385 0.000 
Return-based Ratios Isr_Infor_Ratio -0.282 0.000 
Return-based Ratios Stdzd_Infor_Ratio_3 
-0.170 0.000 
Return-based Ratios Shp_VaRCF_rf_v2 -0.042 0.000 
Return-based Ratios Modified_Jensen 0.051 0.000 
Return-based Ratios Shp_VaRCF_ifl_v05 0.248 0.000 
Return-based Ratios Shp_CVaR_rf_v1_v01 0.660 0.000 
Return-based Ratios Sortino_Sat_ifl_2 1.485 0.000 
Return-based Differences eSDAR -0.448 0.000 
Return-based Differences Jensen_alpha -0.258 0.000 
Return-based Differences Trn_Maz_alpha -0.184 0.000 
Return-based Differences Alpha_mkt_tim_HM -0.153 0.000 
Return-based Differences SRAP -0.124 0.000 
Return-based Differences Hnr_Mrt_alpha -0.097 0.001 
Return-based Differences Hwang_Satchell -0.037 0.000 
Return-based Differences Moses_Cheney_Veit -0.014 0.073 
Return-based Differences Alpha_TM_cond_beta 0.200 0.000 
Return-based Differences Total_risk_alpha 0.218 0.000 
Return-based Differences Trn_Maz_cub_alpha 0.389 0.000 
Preference-based Prosp_rat_rf_2v25 -3.690 0.000 
Preference-based Stutzer_ifl -0.268 0.000 
Preference-based Psp_S_K_rt_rf_5 0.331 0.001 
Preference-based Psp_S_K_rt_rf_2v25 2.949 0.000 
Gain-based Ratios Rv_avg_dup_ddwn_rf -0.702 0.000 
Gain-based Ratios Rv_rf_v01_v5_v05 -0.393 0.000 
Gain-based Ratios Rv_rf_v01_v2_v05 0.171 0.000 
Gain-based Ratios Rv_rf_v01_v5_v2 0.292 0.000 
Gain-based Ratios Rv_max_dup_ddwn_rf 0.681 0.000 
Market Timing Gamma_TM_cond_beta -0.036 0.025 
Market Timing Hnr_Mrt_3_f_gam_smb 0.162 0.000 
Frailty prop_death_quarter_all -5.636 0.000 
 Contagion prop_death_quarter_group 4.404 0.000 
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This Table reports the coefficients of the logistic function for a performance horizon h = 3 years and a 
prediction period T = 12 months. Acronyms of the measures are reported together with their class 
according to the Appendix. The last two lines correspond to the proportion of all funds which closed 
during the last quarter, and the proportion of closed funds which own the same main benchmark. The p-
values are reported on the last column. 
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Table 6. Results per type of disappearance (performance horizon h = 3 years) 
 
Panel A – Somers’ D statistic 
Type Sample 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 
All 
MS 0.403 0.404 0.420 0.423 0.401 
VS 0.311 0.334 0.335 0.333 0.319 
# var 19 18 23 33 35 
Liquidation 
MS 0.428 0.476 0.466 0.454 0.420 
VS 0.216 0.255 0.252 0.250 0.263 
# var  14 26 26 29 33 
Merger 
MS 0.534 0.554 0.545 0.519 0.505 
VS 0.358 0.375 0.370 0.357 0.339 
 # var 25 29 29 33 36 
 
Panel B – Comparison of the contribution of the classes of measures 
 













group Average Rank 
Gain-based differences 
    
0.181 0.181 0.181 7 
    
Gain-based ratios 0.318 0.318 0.318 3 0.262 0.262 0.262 4 0.414 0.414 0.414 2 
Market timing alphas 0.264 0.264 0.264 5 0.263 0.263 0.263 3 0.307 0.307 0.307 5 
Market timing gammas 0.178 0.178 0.178 6 0.254 0.254 0.254 5 0.227 0.227 0.227 6 
Preference-based 0.302 0.302 0.302 4 0.236 0.236 0.236 6 0.371 0.371 0.371 3 
Return-based differences 0.353 0.353 0.353 1 0.389 0.389 0.389 1 0.424 0.424 0.424 1 
Return-based ratios 0.343 0.343 0.343 2 0.331 0.331 0.331 2 0.357 0.357 0.357 4 
All 0.423 0.333 0.378   0.454 0.250 0.352   0.519 0.357 0.438   
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This Table reports, in Panel A, the ventilation of Somers’ D statistics for the models of the logistic regression that include the proportions of 
closed funds, according to the type of delisting: liquidation or merger. Values are reported for a performance horizon ℎ = 3 years and five 
prediction periods T: 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 12 months and 18 months Values are reported for the modeling sample (MS) and for the 
validation sample (VS). On the third row, the numbers of variables retained in the model are also reported. Panel B compares the Somers’ D of the 
models built with only measures of one class. Reported figures are computed for a performance horizon h of 3 years, a prediction period T of 12 
months. First column reports results for all delistings, while the last two columns reports results for liquidations and mergers only. 
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Table 7. Somers’ D for 10 classical performance measures 
    
Disappearance time T years 
Models without frailty / contagion Models with frailty / contagion 
Measure Sample 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 Average 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 Average 
Bernardo_Ledoit_rf MS 0.263 0.283 0.285 0.282 0.273 0.277 0.313 0.317 0.310 0.301 0.285 0.305 
VS 0.203 0.233 0.248 0.259 0.265 0.242 0.266 0.285 0.286 0.286 0.274 0.279 
Fama_French_alpha 
MS 0.238 0.245 0.239 0.234 0.227 0.237 0.303 0.300 0.280 0.262 0.245 0.278 
VS 0.202 0.239 0.253 0.260 0.255 0.242 0.281 0.300 0.303 0.299 0.273 0.291 
Hnr_Mrt_gamma 
MS 0.043 0.039 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.034 0.229 0.213 0.178 0.153 0.114 0.177 
VS -0.017 0.003 0.001 -0.011 -0.013 -0.007 0.233 0.234 0.216 0.198 0.143 0.205 
Jensen_alpha 
MS 0.127 0.130 0.127 0.124 0.119 0.126 0.245 0.230 0.202 0.181 0.155 0.203 
VS 0.046 0.081 0.086 0.090 0.067 0.074 0.221 0.236 0.219 0.199 0.138 0.203 
MorningStar_3 MS 0.244 0.265 0.270 0.272 0.272 0.265 0.301 0.304 0.296 0.290 0.282 0.294 VS 0.194 0.224 0.236 0.246 0.259 0.232 0.263 0.281 0.279 0.279 0.271 0.275 
Moses_Cheney_Veit 
MS 0.014 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.229 0.219 0.192 0.159 0.119 0.184 
VS 0.003 0.022 -0.023 -0.010 -0.015 -0.005 0.243 0.237 0.222 0.199 0.150 0.210 
Rv_rf_v01_v05_v05 MS 0.081 0.088 0.088 0.091 0.091 0.088 0.236 0.222 0.195 0.173 0.143 0.194 
VS 0.033 0.060 0.068 0.069 0.080 0.062 0.240 0.239 0.227 0.212 0.165 0.217 
Sharpe_ratio 
MS 0.264 0.283 0.286 0.284 0.275 0.278 0.311 0.317 0.310 0.301 0.286 0.305 
VS 0.205 0.236 0.251 0.261 0.267 0.244 0.268 0.287 0.287 0.289 0.276 0.281 
Sortino_rf 
MS 0.265 0.284 0.288 0.286 0.276 0.280 0.312 0.317 0.311 0.302 0.285 0.305 
VS 0.209 0.240 0.253 0.264 0.269 0.247 0.268 0.287 0.288 0.289 0.278 0.282 
Treynor 
MS 0.261 0.278 0.281 0.281 0.273 0.275 0.305 0.311 0.302 0.297 0.283 0.300 
VS 0.204 0.229 0.239 0.248 0.256 0.235 0.266 0.281 0.275 0.276 0.265 0.273 
Average 
MS 0.180 0.191 0.191 0.190 0.185 0.187 0.278 0.275 0.258 0.242 0.220 0.255 
VS 0.128 0.157 0.161 0.168 0.169 0.157 0.255 0.267 0.260 0.253 0.223 0.252 
Combination 
MS 0.315 0.325 0.326 0.323 0.316 0.321 0.349 0.349 0.339 0.332 0.321 0.338 
VS 0.234 0.267 0.278 0.287 0.290 0.271 0.283 0.302 0.300 0.301 0.292 0.296 
 
46 
This Table reports Somers’ D of the modeling sample (MS) and of the validation sample (VS), for models where the logistic function uses quintile 
dummy variables built on with only 10 popular performance measures. The first reported values are for models built with only one of these 
measures, while values for a combined model, including all of them, are reported at the bottom. Values are reported for a performance horizon h = 
3 years and five prediction periods: T = 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 12 months and 18 months. The left part reports values for models including 
only performance measures, while the right side reports results for models that include the proportions of dead funds of the same class (contagion) 
and of the whole database (frailty) during the previous quarter. Average values for all prediction periods are reported on the last column of each 
part of the Table. 
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Table 8. Predictability for subsets of funds 
Panel A: Per currency of denomination 
 
 
Disappearance time T (years) 
Currency Sample 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 
EUR 
MS 0.608 0.595 0.591 0.583 0.520 
VS 0.389 0.452 0.455 0.447 0.385 
# var 20 23 23 31 29 
GBP 
MS 0.432 0.452 0.417 0.394 0.392 
VS 0.229 0.264 0.228 0.256 0.234 
# var 20 27 23 23 26 
              
Panel B: Per country of incorporation 
 
 
Disappearance time T (years) 
Country Sample 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 
UK 
MS 0.454 0.451 0.445 0.416 0.425 
VS 0.228 0.282 0.217 0.249 0.229 
# var 21 26 29 24 33 
LU 
MS 0.608 0.645 0.610 0.599 0.591 
VS 0.373 0.424 0.432 0.399 0.394 
# var 15 24 27 25 30 
 
This Table reports the Somers’ D of the models built by a logistic regression where the potential 
independent variables are quintile dummy variables built on the 56 selected measures, for populations 
restricted to one currency of denomination (EUR = Euro and GBP = British Pound, in Panel A) or one 
country of incorporation (UK = the United Kingdom and LU = Luxembourg, in Panel B). Results are 
reported for the modeling sample (MS) and the validation sample (VS), with the number of variables in 
the models in italics. Values are reported for a performance horizon ℎ = 3 years and five prediction 
periods: T = 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 12 months and 18 months. The results are reported for models 
that include the proportions of dead funds of the same class (contagion) and of the whole database 
(frailty) during the previous quarter.  
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Table 9. Predictability in bullish and bearish markets 
    EUR GBP All currencies 
Type Sample Bear Bull Bear Bull Bear Bull 
All 
MS 0.606 0.826 0.465 0.603 0.402 0.553 
VS 0.339 0.391 0.178 0.040 0.277 0.215 
# var 40 39 39 39 47 48 
Liquidation 
MS 0.685 0.826 0.592 0.735 0.513 0.631 
VS 0.259 0.241 0.125 0.086 0.228 0.226 
# var 32 42 34 35 39 37 
Merger 
MS 0.702 0.926 0.608 0.754 0.530 0.625 
VS 0.332 0.165 0.234 0.102 0.270 0.218 
# var 31 28 37 38 39 35 
 
This Table reports the Somers’ D of the modeling sample and of the validation sample, for models where 
the trend of the market is considered during the performance period. All models include the proportions 
of dead funds of the same class (contagion) and of the whole database (frailty) during the previous 
quarter. The upper part reports the results for models using only the performance measures. The lower 
part reports the results for models that that use the performance measures and their differences. A period 
is considered to be bullish if the difference between the average market return and the risk-free is 
positive; otherwise, it is considered to be bearish. Results are reported for the modeling sample (MS) and 
the validation sample (VS), and for populations restricted to EUR = Euro or GBP = British Pound as 
currency of denomination, then for all funds. Ventilation by delisting type is also reported. The values are 
reported for a performance horizon ℎ = 3 years and a prediction period T = 12 months. 
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Table 10. Returns and performance of rebalanced quintiles portfolios versus naïve portfolio 
  Quintile Portfolio 
Naïve 
portfolio Penalty 
level Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
0% 4.44% 3.48% 3.62% 3.60% 5.42% 4.18% 0.153 0.096 0.105 0.105 0.209 0.138 
1% 4.36% 3.42% 3.57% 3.57% 5.40% 4.13% 
2% 4.28% 3.36% 3.52% 3.53% 5.38% 4.08% 
3% 4.20% 3.30% 3.47% 3.50% 5.35% 4.03% 
5% 4.04% 3.18% 3.38% 3.44% 5.31% 3.93% 0.130 0.078 0.090 0.097 0.203 0.123 
10% 3.64% 2.89% 3.13% 3.28% 5.20% 3.69% 
20% 2.85% 2.31% 2.64% 2.97% 4.97% 3.21% 
50% 0.50% 0.57% 1.19% 2.03% 4.30% 1.77% 
75% -1.42% -0.86% 0.00% 1.26% 3.74% 0.58% 
100% -3.31% -2.27% -1.19% 0.48% 3.18% -0.59% 
This Table reports the performance of the five quintile portfolios built according to the model including performance measures and proportions of 
closed funds, when the performance horizon h is 3 years and the prediction period T is 1 year, and compares to the performance of a naïve random 
portfolio. Each row reports the average return of each portfolio, depending on the penalty applied when a fund is delisted, and before reinvesting 
its last price in all living funds of the same portfolio. The Sharpe ratios of the quintile and the naïve portfolios are reported for 2 levels of penalty 
(0% and 5%). The Jobson and Korkie (1981) test statistic (unreported) for the difference between the Sharpe ratio of the Q5 portfolio and the naïve 
portfolio is significant at the 10% and 5% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 11. Somers’ D statistic for augmented models based on AUM, age and past returns 
Variables   Somers’ D 
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X   X X X   0.360 0.337 
This Table reports Somers’ D for logistic regression models where the independent variables are various 
combinations of the AUM of the funds, its age, the log of age, past returns, and past performance 
combined with the proportions of dead funds (contagion and frailty). The results are reported for a 
performance horizon h = 1 year and two prediction periods: T = 1 and 1.5 years. The sample sizes are 
1,573 funds for the models with age and returns, and reduce to 1,108 for models with AUM included 
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Figure 1. ROC curves corresponding to the model of the logistic regression 
 
 
This Figure reports the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves corresponding to the logistic 
regression model issued for a performance horizon h = 3 years and a prediction period T = 12 months. We 
report the curves for the modeling group and for the validation group. The diagonal straight line 
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Figure 2. Time evolution of the rebalanced quintile portfolios 
 
This Figure shows the evolution of the value for the quintile portfolios built using the model (considering 
a performance horizon h = 3 years and prediction period T = 1 year). A penalty of 5% is applied to the last 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Acronym Full name Parameters Class Initial reference Section Select 
Adj_Skew_Sharpe_3 Adjusted for Skewness Sharpe Ratio (ASSR)   
Return-based 
Ratio 
Zakamouline V. and Koekebakker 
S. (2009), JBF 3_1_1_4 N 
Aftal_Ponc_2 Aftalion and Poncet's index Price of risk = 2 Return-based Difference 
Aftalion F. and Poncet P. (1991), 
RB 4_1_1_6 Y 
Aftal_Ponc_3 Aftalion and Poncet's index Price of risk = 3 Return-based Difference id. 4_1_1_6 N 




Christopherson J., Ferson W. and 
Turner A. (1999), JPM 4_2_2_6 N 




Ferson W. and Schadt R. (1996), 
JoF 4_2_2_5 Y 
Alpha_mkt_tim_HM 
Market timing alpha, 
according to Henriksson and 
Merton's model  
Market 
timing Hübner G. (2011), WP  Y 
Alpha_mkt_tim_TM 
Market timing alpha, 
according to Treynor and 
Mazuy's model  
Market 
timing id.  Y 
Alpha_TM_cond_beta 
Alpha in Treynor and 
Mazuy's conditional market 
timing model  
Market 
timing 
Ferson W. and Schadt R. (1996), 
JoF 6_2_3_1 Y 
Bernardo_Ledoit_ifl Bernardo-Ledoit gain loss 
ratio, or Omega Reserve return = inflation rate 
Return-based 
Ratio 
Bernardo A. and Ledoit O. 
(2000), JPE; Keating C. and 
Shadwick W. (2002), JPMr 
3_1_3_1_1 N 
Bernardo_Ledoit_rf Bernardo-Ledoit gain loss 
ratio, or Omega Reserve return = risk-free rate 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_1_1 N 
Bernardo_Ledoit_zro Bernardo-Ledoit gain loss 
ratio, or Omega Reserve return = zero percent 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_1_1 N 
Burke_3 Burke ratio 
 
Return-based 
Ratio Burke G. (1994), Fu 3_1_3_3_4_3 N 
Calmar Calmar ratio 
 
Return-based 
Ratio Young T. (1991), Fu 3_1_3_3_1 N 
Carhart_alpha Alpha based on Carhart's four factors model  
Return-based 
Difference Carhart M. (1997), JoF 4_2_2_2 N 
Downsd_risk_Sharpe Downside-risk Sharpe ratio 
 
Return-based 
Ratio Ziemba W. (2005), JPM 3_1_2_1_2 N 
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Acronym Full name Parameters Class Initial reference Section Select 
eSDAR Excess standard deviation 
adjusted return (eSDAR)  
Return-based 
Difference Statman M. (1987), JFQA 4_1_1_5 Y 
Fama_French_alpha Alpha based on Fama and French's three factors model  
Return-based 
Difference 
Fama E. and French K. (1992), 
JoF, Fama E. and French K. 
(1993), JFE 
4_2_2_1 Y 
Far_Tib_ifl_1_5x1 Farinelli-Tibiletti ratio 
Reserve return = inflation rate, order of 
upper partial moment = 1.5, order of lower 
partial moment = 1 
Return-based 
Ratio 
Farinelli S. and Tibiletti L. 
(2008), EJOR 3_1_3_1_4 N 
Far_Tib_ifl_2x4 Farinelli-Tibiletti ratio 
Reserve return = inflation rate, order of 
upper partial moment = 2, order of lower 
partial moment = 2 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_1_4 Y 
Far_Tib_ifl_2x9 Farinelli-Tibiletti ratio 
Reserve return = inflation rate, order of 
upper partial moment = 2, order of lower 
partial moment = 3 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_1_4 N 
Far_Tib_rf_1_5x1 Farinelli-Tibiletti ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, order of 
upper partial moment = 1.5, order of lower 
partial moment = 1 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_1_4 N 
Far_Tib_rf_2x4 Farinelli-Tibiletti ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, order of 
upper partial moment = 2, order of lower 
partial moment = 2 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_1_4 N 
Far_Tib_rf_2x9 Farinelli-Tibiletti ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, order of 
upper partial moment = 2, order of lower 
partial moment = 3 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_1_4 N 
Fouse_ifl_1 Fouse's index Reserve return = inflation rate, coefficient 
of aversion to risk = 1 
Gain-based 
Difference Sortino F. and Price L. (1994), JoI 4_3_3_1 N 
Fouse_ifl_2 Fouse's index Reserve return = inflation rate, coefficient 
of aversion to risk = 2 
Gain-based 
Difference id. 4_3_3_1 N 
Fouse_ifl_3 Fouse's index Reserve return = inflation rate, coefficient 
of aversion to risk = 3 
Gain-based 
Difference id. 4_3_3_1 N 
Fouse_rf_1 Fouse's index Reserve return = risk-free rate, coefficient 
of aversion to risk = 1 
Gain-based 
Difference id. 4_3_3_1 Y 
Fouse_rf_2 Fouse's index Reserve return = risk-free rate, coefficient 
of aversion to risk = 2 
Gain-based 
Difference id. 4_3_3_1 N 
Fouse_rf_3 Fouse's index Reserve return = risk-free rate, coefficient 
of aversion to risk = 3 
Gain-based 
Difference id. 4_3_3_1 N 
Gamma_TM_cond_beta Conditional Treynor and Mazuy's coefficient  
Market 
timing 
Ferson W. and Schadt R. (1996), 
JoF 6_2_3_1 Y 
Gen_Bla_Trn_alpha Generalized Black-Treynor 
ratio  
Return-based 
Ratio Hübner G. (2005), RoF 3_2_2_2 Y 
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Acronym Full name Parameters Class Initial reference Section Select 
Gini Gini ratio 
 
Return-based 
Ratio Yitzhaki S. (1982), AER 3_1_2_3_2 N 
Hnr_Mrt_3_f_alpha 
Alpha in Henriksson and 
Merton model with a three-
factor context  
Market 
timing 
Chan L., Chen H.L. and 
Lakonishok J. (2002), RFS 6_2_2_4 Y 
Hnr_Mrt_3_f_gam_hml 
Gamma related to factor hml 
in Henriksson and Merton 




timing id. 6_2_2_4 Y 
Hnr_Mrt_3_f_gam_rm 
Gamma related to market in 
Henriksson and Merton 




timing id. 6_2_2_4 Y 
Hnr_Mrt_3_f_gam_smb 
Gamma related to factor smb 
in Henriksson and Merton 




timing id. 6_2_2_4 Y 
Hnr_Mrt_alpha 
Alpha in Henriksson and 




Henriksson R. and Merton R. 
(1981), JB 6_1_2_1 Y 





id. 6_1_2_1 Y 
Hwang_Satchell Higher moment measure of Hwang and Satchell  
Return-based 
Difference 
Hwang S. and Satchell S. (1999), 
IJFE 4_2_2_8 Y 




Treynor J. and Black F. (1973), 
JB 3_3_2_1 N 
Isr_Infor_Ratio Israelsen's modified information ratio  
Return-based 
Ratio Israelsen C. (2005), JAM 3_3_2_2 Y 
Isr_Roy_ifl Israelsen’s modified Roy's 
measure 
Reserve return = inflation rate Return-based Ratio id. 3_1_1_2 Y 
Isr_Roy_zro Israelsen’s modified Roy's 
measure 
Reserve return = zero percent Return-based Ratio id. 3_1_1_2 N 
Isr_Sharpe_ratio Israelsen’s modified Sharpe 
ratio  
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_1_2 N 
Jensen_alpha Jensen's alpha 
 
Return-based 
Difference Jensen M. (1968), JoF 4_2_1_1_1 Y 
M2 M² index, or risk-adjusted performance (RAP)  
Return-based 
Difference 
Modigliani F. and Modigliani L. 
(1997), JPM 4_1_1_1 Y 
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M2_Sortino_rf M² for Sortino 
 
Return-based 
Difference Bacon C. (2008), book 4_1_1_2 N 
MAD Mean absolute deviation (MAD) ratio  
Return-based 
Ratio 
Konno H. and Yamazaki H. 
(1991), MS 3_1_2_3_1 N 
Martin Martin ratio or Ulcer performance index  
Return-based 
Ratio 
Martin P. and McCann B. (1989), 




Ratio Young M. (1998), MS 3_1_2_3_3 N 
Mod_Treynor Modified Treynor ratio 
 
Return-based 
Ratio Bacon C. (2008), book 3_2_1_2 Y 




Smith K. and Tito D. (1969), 
JFQA 3_2_2_1 Y 
MorningStar_1 Morningstar risk adjusted 
return (MRAR) Relative aversion to risk coefficient = 1 
Preference 
based MorningStar (2007), WP 5_1_1_4 N 
MorningStar_2 Morningstar risk adjusted 
return (MRAR) Relative aversion to risk coefficient = 2 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_1_4 N 
MorningStar_3 Morningstar risk adjusted 
return (MRAR) Relative aversion to risk coefficient = 3 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_1_4 N 




Moses E., Cheyney J. and Veit T. 
(1987), JPM 3_3_1_1 Y 
MRAP Market risk-adjusted performance (MRAP)  
Return-based 
Difference 
Scholz H. and Wilkens M. (2005), 
JPMr 4_1_1_3 N 
Prosp_rat_ifl_1 Prospect ratio Reserve return = inflation rate, extent of the loss aversion = 1 
Preference 
based Watanabe Y. (2006), JPMr 5_1_3_1 N 
Prosp_rat_ifl_2v25 Prospect ratio Reserve return = inflation rate, extent of the loss aversion = 2.25 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_3_1 N 
Prosp_rat_ifl_5 Prospect ratio Reserve return = inflation rate, extent of the loss aversion = 5 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_3_1 N 
Prosp_rat_rf_1 Prospect ratio Reserve return = risk-free rate, extent of the loss aversion = 1 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_3_1 N 
Prosp_rat_rf_2v25 Prospect ratio Reserve return = risk-free rate, extent of the loss aversion = 2.25 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_3_1 Y 
Prosp_rat_rf_5 Prospect ratio Reserve return = risk-free rate, extent of the loss aversion = 5 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_3_1 N 
Psp_S_K_rt_ifl_1 Prospect + Skewness / Kurtosis 
Reserve return = inflation rate, extent of the 
loss aversion = 1 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_3_2 N 
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Psp_S_K_rt_ifl_2v25 Prospect + Skewness / Kurtosis 
Reserve return = inflation rate, extent of the 
loss aversion = 2.25 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_3_2 N 
Psp_S_K_rt_ifl_5 Prospect + Skewness / Kurtosis 
Reserve return = inflation rate, extent of the 
loss aversion = 5 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_3_2 N 
Psp_S_K_rt_rf_1 Prospect + Skewness / Kurtosis 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, extent of the 
loss aversion = 1 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_3_2 N 
Psp_S_K_rt_rf_2v25 Prospect + Skewness / Kurtosis 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, extent of the 
loss aversion = 2.25 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_3_2 Y 
Psp_S_K_rt_rf_5 Prospect + Skewness / Kurtosis 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, extent of the 
loss aversion = 5 
Preference 
based id. 5_1_3_2 Y 
RewVaR_rf_v05_v01 Reward-to-VaR ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
VaR = 5%, computed according to the EVT 
with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio 
Alexander G. and Baptista A. 
(2003), JPM 3_1_2_2_2 N 
RewVaR_rf_v1_v01 Reward-to-VaR ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
VaR = 10%, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_2 N 
Roy_ifl Roy's measure Reserve return = inflation rate Return-based Ratio Roy A. (1952), Ec 3_1_1_9 N 
Roy_zro Roy's measure Reserve return = zero percent Return-based Ratio id. 3_1_1_9 N 
Rv_avg_dup_ddwn_ifl Rachev average drawup/down ratio Reserve return = inflation rate 
Return-based 
Ratio 
Ortobelli S., Biglova A., Rachev 
S. and Stoyanov S. (2009), JAFA 3_1_3_3_6 N 
Rv_avg_dup_ddwn_rf Rachev average drawup/down ratio Reserve return = risk-free rate 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_3_6 Y 
Rv_avg_dup_ddwn_zro Rachev average drawup/down ratio Reserve return = zero percent 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_3_6 N 
Rv_ifl_v01_v05_v05 Rachev ratio 
Reserve return = inflation rate, threshold for 
CVaR are 5% for both numerator and 
denominator, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio 
Biglova A., Ortobelli S., Rachev 
S. and Stoyanov S. (2004), JPM 3_1_3_2_1 Y 
Rv_ifl_v01_v5_v2 Rachev ratio 
Reserve return = inflation rate, threshold for 
CVaR are 50% for numerator and 20% for 
denominator, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_2_1 Y 
Rv_max_dup_ddwn_ifl Rachev maximum drawup/down ratio Reserve return = inflation rate 
Return-based 
Ratio 
Ortobelli S., Biglova A., Rachev 
S. and Stoyanov S. (2009), JAFA 3_1_3_3_5 N 
Rv_max_dup_ddwn_rf Rachev maximum drawup/down ratio Reserve return = risk-free rate 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_3_5 Y 
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Rv_max_dup_ddwn_zro Rachev maximum drawup/down ratio Reserve return = zero percent 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_3_5 N 
Rv_rf_v01_v05_v05 Rachev ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
CVaR are 5% for both numerator and 
denominator, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio 
Biglova A., Ortobelli S., Rachev 
S. and Stoyanov S. (2004), JPM 3_1_3_2_1 N 
Rv_rf_v01_v2_v05 Rachev ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
CVaR are 20% for numerator and 5% for 
denominator, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_2_1 Y 
Rv_rf_v01_v5_v05 Rachev ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
CVaR are 50% for numerator and 5% for 
denominator, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_2_1 Y 
Rv_rf_v01_v5_v2 Rachev ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
CVaR are 50% for numerator and 20% for 
denominator, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_2_1 Y 
Rv_rf_v01_v5_v5 Rachev ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
CVaR are 50% for both the numerator and 
the denominator, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_3_2_1 Y 
Rwd_to_half_variance Reward to half-variance index  
Return-based 
Ratio Ang J. and Chua J. (1979), JFQA 3_1_2_1_1 N 




Gillet Ph. And Moussavou J. 
(2000), EIR 3_3_2_3 N 
Sharpe_Alpha_1 Sharpe's alpha Coefficient of aversion to shortfall = 1 Gain-based Difference 
Plantinga A. and De Groot S. 
(2001), JPMr 4_3_2_1 N 
Sharpe_Alpha_2 Sharpe's alpha Coefficient of aversion to shortfall = 2 Gain-based Difference id. 4_3_2_1 N 
Sharpe_Alpha_3 Sharpe's alpha Coefficient of aversion to shortfall = 3 Gain-based Difference id. 4_3_2_1 N 
Sharpe_ratio Sharpe ratio 
 
Return-based 
Ratio Sharpe W. (1966), JB 3_1_1_1 N 
Sharpe_SK Sharpe + Skewness / Kurtosis 
 
Return-based 
Ratio Watanabe Y. (2006), JPMr 3_1_1_6 Y 
Shp_CVaR_ifl_v05_v01 
Sharpe ratio based on 
conditional VaR or STARR 
ratio 
Reserve return = inflation rate, threshold for 
CVaR = 5%, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio 
Martin R., Rachev S., and 
Siboulet F. (2003), Wi 3_1_2_2_4 N 
59 
Acronym Full name Parameters Class Initial reference Section Select 
Shp_CVaR_ifl_v1_v01 
Sharpe ratio based on 
conditional VaR or STARR 
ratio 
Reserve return = inflation rate, threshold for 
CVaR = 10%, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_4 N 
Shp_CVaR_rf_v05_v01 
Sharpe ratio based on 
conditional VaR or STARR 
ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
CVaR = 5%, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_4 N 
Shp_CVaR_rf_v1_v01 
Sharpe ratio based on 
conditional VaR or STARR 
ratio 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
CVaR = 10%, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_4 Y 
Shp_CVaR_zro_v05_v01 
Sharpe ratio based on 
conditional VaR or STARR 
ratio 
Reserve return = zero percent, threshold for 
CVaR = 5%, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_4 N 
Shp_CVaR_zro_v1_v01 
Sharpe ratio based on 
conditional VaR or STARR 
ratio 
Reserve return = zero percent, threshold for 
CVaR = 10%, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_4 N 
Shp_VaR_ifl_v05_v01 Sharpe ratio based on the Value at Risk 
Reserve return = inflation rate, threshold for 
VaR = 5%, computed according to the EVT 
with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio 
Dowd K. (1999), JPM; Dowd K. 
(2000), IREF 3_1_2_2_1 N 
Shp_VaR_ifl_v1_v01 Sharpe ratio based on the Value at Risk 
Reserve return = inflation rate, threshold for 
VaR = 10%, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_1 N 
Shp_VaR_rf_v05_v01 Sharpe ratio based on the Value at Risk 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
VaR = 5%, computed according to the EVT 
with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_1 N 
Shp_VaR_rf_v1_v01 Sharpe ratio based on the Value at Risk 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
VaR = 10%, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_1 N 
Shp_VaR_zro_v05_v01 Sharpe ratio based on the Value at Risk 
Reserve return = zero percent, threshold for 
VaR = 5%, computed according to the EVT 
with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_1 N 
Shp_VaR_zro_v1_v01 Sharpe ratio based on the Value at Risk 
Reserve return = zero percent, threshold for 
VaR = 10%, computed according to the 
EVT with threshold = 1% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_1 N 
Shp_VaRCF_ifl_v05 Sharpe ratio based on Cornish-Fisher VaR 
Reserve return = inflation rate, threshold for 
VaR is 5% 
Return-based 
Ratio 
Favre L. and Galeano J.A. (2002), 
JAI 3_1_2_2_3 Y 
Shp_VaRCF_ifl_v2 Sharpe ratio based on Cornish-Fisher VaR 
Reserve return = inflation rate, threshold for 
VaR is 20% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_3 N 
Shp_VaRCF_rf_v05 Sharpe ratio based on Cornish-Fisher VaR 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
VaR is 5% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_3 N 
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Shp_VaRCF_rf_v2 Sharpe ratio based on Cornish-Fisher VaR 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, threshold for 
VaR is 20% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_3 Y 
Shp_VaRCF_zro_v05 Sharpe ratio based on Cornish-Fisher VaR 
Reserve return = zero percent, threshold for 
VaR is 5% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_3 N 
Shp_VaRCF_zro_v2 Sharpe ratio based on Cornish-Fisher VaR 
Reserve return = zero percent, threshold for 
VaR is 20% 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_2_3 N 
Sortino_ifl Sortino ratio Reserve return = inflation rate Return-based Ratio 
Bawa V. (1975), JFE; Ang J. and 
Chua J. (1979), JFQA; Sortino F. 
and Van der Meer R. (1991), JPM 
3_1_2_1_3 N 
Sortino_rf Sortino ratio Reserve return = risk-free rate Return-based Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_3 N 
Sortino_Sat_ifl_1 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 




Sortino F. (2000), PI; Sortino F. 
and Satchell S. (2001), book; 
Kaplan P. and Knowles J. (2004), 
JPMr 
3_1_2_1_5 N 
Sortino_Sat_ifl_2 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 
Reserve return = inflation rate, power index 
= 2 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_5 Y 
Sortino_Sat_ifl_3 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 
Reserve return = inflation rate, power index 
= 3 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_5 N 
Sortino_Sat_ifl_5 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 
Reserve return = inflation rate, power index 
= 5 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_5 N 
Sortino_Sat_rf_1 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, power index 
= 1 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_5 N 
Sortino_Sat_rf_2 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, power index 
= 2 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_5 N 
Sortino_Sat_rf_3 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, power index 
= 3 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_5 N 
Sortino_Sat_rf_5 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 
Reserve return = risk-free rate, power index 
= 5 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_5 N 
Sortino_Sat_zro_1 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 
Reserve return = zero percent, power index 
= 1 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_5 N 
Sortino_Sat_zro_2 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 
Reserve return = zero percent, power index 
= 2 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_5 N 
Sortino_Sat_zro_3 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 
Reserve return = zero percent, power index 
= 3 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_5 N 
Sortino_Sat_zro_5 Sortino-Satchell ratio or Kappa coefficient 
Reserve return = zero percent, power index 
= 5 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_5 N 
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Sortino_SK_ifl Sortino + Skewness / Kurtosis ratio Reserve return = inflation rate 
Return-based 
Ratio Watanabe Y. (2006), JPMr 3_1_2_1_4 Y 
Sortino_SK_rf Sortino + Skewness / Kurtosis ratio Reserve return = risk-free rate 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_4 N 
Sortino_SK_zro Sortino + Skewness / Kurtosis ratio Reserve return = zero percent 
Return-based 
Ratio id. 3_1_2_1_4 N 
Sortino_zro Sortino ratio Reserve return = zero percent Return-based Ratio 
Bawa V. (1975), JFE; Ang J. and 
Chua J. (1979), JFQA; Sortino F. 
and Van der Meer R. (1991), JPM 
3_1_2_1_3 N 
SRAP Style risk-adjusted performance measure (SRAP)  
Return-based 
Difference Lobosco A. (1999), JPM 4_1_1_4 Y 
Stdzd_Infor_Ratio_1 Standardized Information 
ratio n°1  
Return-based 
Ratio 
Bodson L., Cavenaile L., Hübner 
G. (2009), WP  N 
Stdzd_Infor_Ratio_2 Standardized Information 
ratio n°2  
Return-based 
Ratio id.  Y 
Stdzd_Infor_Ratio_3 Standardized Information 
ratio n°3  
Return-based 
Ratio id.  Y 
Stdzd_Infor_Ratio_4 Standardized Information 
ratio n°4  
Return-based 
Ratio id.  Y 
Sterling Sterling ratio 
 
Return-based 
Ratio Kestner L. (1996), Fu 3_1_3_3_2 Y 
Sterling_Calmar_3 Sterling-Calmar ratio 
 
Return-based 
Ratio  3_1_3_3_3_3 N 
Stutzer_ifl Stutzer index of convergence Threshold = inflation rate Preference based Stutzer M. (2000), FAJ 5_1_1_2 Y 
Stutzer_rf Stutzer index of convergence Threshold = risk-free rate Preference based id. 5_1_1_2 Y 
Total_risk_alpha Total risk alpha 
 
Return-based 
Difference Fama E. (1972), JoF 4_2_1_2_4 Y 
Treynor Treynor ratio 
 
Return-based 
Ratio Treynor J. (1965), HBR 3_2_1_1 N 
Trn_Maz_alpha Alpha in Treynor and Mazuy's market timing model  
Market 
timing 
Treynor J. and Mazuy K. (1966), 
HBR 6_1_1_1 Y 
Trn_Maz_cub_alpha Alpha in Treynor and Mazuy 
extended timing model  
Market 
timing 
Jagannathan R. and Korajczyk R. 
(1986), JB 6_2_1_1 Y 
Trn_Maz_cub_delta Delta in Treynor and Mazuy 
extended timing model  
Market 
timing id. 6_2_1_1 Y 
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Trn_Maz_cub_gamma 
Gamma in Treynor and 





id. 6_2_1_1 Y 





Treynor J. and Mazuy K. (1966), 
HBR 6_1_1_1 Y 
Upsd_pot_ratio_ifl Upside potential ratio Reserve return = inflation rate Return-based Ratio 
Sortino F., Van der Meer R. and 
Plantinga A. (1999), JPM 3_1_3_1_3 Y 
Upsd_pot_ratio_rf Upside potential ratio Reserve return = risk-free rate Return-based Ratio id. 3_1_3_1_3 N 
This Table reports the 147 measures used in the paper. For each measure, the columns ci (from left to right) report the following information: (c1) 
acronym of the measure as it will be used in other Tables and Figures; (c2) full name; (c3) parameters used in the computation, if applicable; (c4) class of 
the measure in Cogneau and Hübner (2009 and 2009a); (c5) name(s) of the author(s), year of publication, acronym of the Journal : AER = American 
Economic Review, Ec = Econometrica, EIR = European Investment Review, EJOR = European Journal of Operational Research, FAJ = Financial 
Analysts Journal, Fu = Futures, HBR = Harvard Business Review, IJFE = international journal of Finance and Economics, IREF = International Review 
of Economics and Finance, JAFA = Journal of Applied Functional Analysis, JAI = Journal of Alternative Investments, JAM = Journal of Asset 
Management, JB = Journal of Business, JBF = Journal of Banking and Finance, JFE = Journal of Financial Economics, JFQA = Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, JoF = Journal of Finance, JoI = Journal of Investing, JPM = Journal of Performance Management, JPMr = Journal of 
Performance Measurement, MS = Management Science, PI = Pensions and Investments, RB = Revue Banque, RFS = Review of Financial Studies, RoF 
= Review of Finance, Wi = Wilmott, WP = Working Paper; (c6) section where the measure is classified in Cogneau and Hübner (2009 and 2009a); (c7) 
flag indicating if the measure is in the 56 measures whose two-by-two Kendall’s correlation is lower than 85%, and thus is candidate to the logistic 
regression. 
